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SS EX REL. K.B.D. V. DREW: THE FAILURE TO ALIGN 
BIOLOGICAL AND LEGAL PATERNITY—WHEN CLEAR 
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE ISN’T ENOUGH 
Chelsea Gomez∗ 
I. BACKGROUND 
The case of State of Louisiana, Department of Social Services 
ex rel. K.B.D. v. Drew1 required the Louisiana Second Circuit 
Court of Appeal to determine whether a presumed father, under 
Louisiana Civil Code article 185, could successfully file a petition 
to disavow paternity more than five years after the birth of his 
presumed child by providing clear and convincing evidence that he 
was not the biological father of the child.2 Particularly, the court 
was asked to determine whether a presumed father could 
successfully disavow paternity when he had no reason to question 
paternity until four years after the child’s birth.  
After becoming pregnant out of wedlock, the mother of K.B.D. 
married her boyfriend, Marion Drew, Jr., in December 2003. Six 
months later, on June 14, 2004, the child was born of the marriage, 
and the husband signed the certificate of live birth. The husband 
filed for divorce more than four years later. At this point, he never 
questioned the biological paternity of the child. After the state filed 
a rule to establish support on behalf of the minor child in April 
2008,3 the husband acquired knowledge that the mother might 
                                                                                                             
 ∗  Candidate, J.D./D.C.L., 2013, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana 
State University. The author would like to thank Professors John Randall Trahan 
and Olivier Moréteau for their guidance throughout the writing of this Case 
Note.  
 1. 46,337, (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/29/11); 70 So. 3d 1011. 
 2. Id. at 1012. 
 3. Id. at 1011, n.1 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 651 and 608) “. . .recipients of 
AFDC under Title IV D of the Social Security Act assign their child support 
rights to the state and are required to cooperate (unless good cause for refusing 
to do so is determined to exist) in whatever legal action the state undertakes. By 
assigning their child support rights in return for AFDC aid, they give the states 
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have slept with another man around the time of conception. In June 
2008, the presumed father requested DNA testing, which 
ultimately determined that he was not the biological father. In July 
2009, he filed a petition to annul his acknowledgment and in 
October 2009 amended his petition to disavow paternity. This suit 
was brought more than four years after the birth and more than a 
year after questioning filiation. 
II. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 
A divided court4 upheld the legal presumption of paternity and 
dismissed the father’s disavowal action as prescribed, with a 
concurring opinion advocating for the application of contra non 
valentem when a father, such as the presumptive father in the 
instant case, was not informed of the possibility that the baby could 
have been fathered by another man.5 In its legal analysis, the 
majority quickly disposed of the petition in which the presumed 
father attempted to annul his acknowledgement of paternity.6 He 
alleged that Louisiana Revised Statute 9:392(A)(7)(b) allowed him 
to annul his acknowledgment because he was able to prove, by 
clear and convincing evidence, that he was not the biological 
father.7 The court, however, recognized that the acknowledgment 
referred to is not that which can be accomplished by the signing of 
the birth certificate at the time of birth, but rather that which can be 
accomplished by the execution of an authentic act of 
acknowledgment or by the subsequent signing of the birth 
certificate.8 As the court correctly noted, the presumed father in 
this case had not made such an acknowledgment. In addition, the 
                                                                                                             
 
the opportunity to recoup the financial drain imposed by the welfare system on 
the state and federal treasuries.” 
 4. Id. at 1016 (Judge Stewart concurring in a separate opinion). 
 5. Id. at 1015, 1016.  
 6. Id. at 1014. 
 7. Id.  
 8. Id.  
2012] SOCIAL SERVICES EX REL. K.B.D. V. DREW 271 
 
 
 
court noted, even if the father had made such an acknowledgment 
and even if it were to have been annulled, the outcome of the case 
would not have been changed: the child was born of the marriage; 
therefore, the presumption of paternity created by Civil Code 
article 185 was valid without any acknowledgment required.9  
The court relied on Louisiana Civil Code articles 185 and 189 
in deciding this dispute.10 Article 185 states, “The husband of the 
mother is presumed to be the father of a child born during the 
marriage or within three hundred days from the date of the 
termination of the marriage.”11The husband and presumed father 
may rebut this presumption by bringing a “disavowal action.”12 
This action is further governed by the one year liberative 
prescription period of Louisiana Civil Code Article 189, which 
provides that prescription commences from the day the husband 
learns of, or should have learned of the birth of the child.13 The 
only exception provided is if the husband and mother continuously 
lived separate and apart during the three hundred days preceding 
the birth.14 In that case, prescription does not begin to run until the 
husband is notified in writing that someone has asserted he is the 
child’s father.15 
The court recognized that the presumed father’s testimony, the 
mother’s testimony, and the DNA results successfully proved, by 
clear and convincing evidence, that he was not the biological 
father, thus, meeting the requirements of Louisiana Civil Code 
article 187 for a successful disavowal action.16 Regardless of such 
proof, the language of article 189 is clear and unambiguous—
prescription should start on the date the presumed father learned or 
                                                                                                             
 9. Id.  
 10. Id. at 1012-1013. 
 11. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 185 (2011). 
 12. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 187 (2011). 
 13. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 189 (2011).  
 14. Id.  
 15. Id.  
 16. Drew, 70 So. 3d at 1013; LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 187 (2011). 
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should have learned of the birth.17 Though the prescriptive period 
may be subject to the doctrine of contra non valentem,18 the court 
recognized that the presumed father, under these circumstances, 
clearly knew that the child was born on the date of birth, which 
disallowed interruption or suspension of the prescriptive period.19 
Therefore, by the time the complaint was filed in the instant 
matter, the cause of action had prescribed. Under this analysis, the 
majority of the Second Circuit seems willing to apply the doctrine 
of contra non valentem only if the father has no reason to know 
about the actual birth, not in cases where he had no reason to 
question the biological paternity until a later date. Though this 
reasoning is consistent with the public policy to “protect innocent 
children, born during the marriage,” the doctrine would be 
unnecessary in such circumstances.20 If the husband has no reason 
to know of the birth of the child, article 189 already provides for 
interruption of prescription until he should have learned of the 
birth.21 Although the court states that contra non valentem could 
be applied to this prescriptive period, its reasoning rejecting its 
application seemingly bars the doctrine from use in disavowal 
suits.  
The Second Circuit recognized that the changes made in 2005 
to the law of filiation liberalize the strict nature of the 
presumptions, more closely aligning biological and legal 
                                                                                                             
 17. LA. CIV. CODE Ann. art. 189 (2011). 
 18. See Corsey v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Corrections, 375 So. 2d 1319, 1321-
22 (recognizing that “Louisiana jurisprudence has recognized a limited 
exception [to the running of prescription] where in fact and for good cause a 
plaintiff is unable to exercise his cause of action when it accrues” The Court also 
recognizes that this “principle is often denoted by the maxim Contra non 
valentem agere nulla currit praescriptio” and is “especially applicable in the 
present instance, where the plaintiff's inability to act is due to the defendant's 
willful or negligent conduct.”); Benjamin West Janke and François-Xavier 
Licari, Contra Non Valentem in France and Louisiana: Revealing the 
Parenthood, Breaking a Myth, 71 LA. L. REV. 503 (explaining the relationship 
between the Louisiana and French courts’ treatment of the extra-codal principle 
of contra non valentem in prescription law).  
 19. Drew, 70 So. 3d at 1014.  
 20. Id. at 1015.  
 21. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 189 (2011).  
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paternity.22 These changes make the presumption more easily 
rebuttable, including changing the period to disavow from 
peremptive to prescriptive and extending an action of contestation 
to the mother of the child.23 However, the court states that the 
unambiguous prescription period must govern, and prescription 
was deemed to have run. Therefore, the Second Circuit affirmed 
the grant of the state’s exception of prescription.24 This reasoning 
is in stark contrast with the concurring opinion. Judge Stewart’s 
separate concurring opinion advocates for the application of contra 
non valentem, a doctrine standing for the “proposition that 
prescription does not run against those who cannot act.”25 
Louisiana courts allow contra non valentem to apply and prevent 
the running of liberative prescription when the “cause of action is 
not known or reasonably knowable by the plaintiff.”26 Judge 
Stewart states that this doctrine should be applicable “in matters 
like this one, where the mother withheld information” and 
“prevented him from availing himself of the disavowal action.”27 
In particular, the mother never informed the presumed father that 
she was still sexually involved with her ex-boyfriend at the time of 
conception.28 Whereas the majority seemingly would never apply 
contra non valentem to a disavowal action, Judge Stewart 
recommends this doctrine be applied when the mother withholds 
information necessary for the presumed father to avail himself to 
his cause of action.  
III. COMMENTARY  
The Second Circuit majority decision in SS ex rel. K.B.D. v. 
Drew reinforces the notion that the presumption of paternity found 
                                                                                                             
 22. Drew, 70 So. 3d at 1013-1015. 
 23. Id. at 1014.  
 24. Id. at 1013-1015. 
 25. Id. at 1017.  
 26. Id. (citing Corsey v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Corrections, 375 So. 2d 
13139, 1321-22 (La. 1979)). 
 27. Id.  
 28. Id. at 1016.  
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in Louisiana Civil Code article 185 is one of the strongest 
presumptions in Louisiana law.29 Regardless of the ability to 
determine biological paternity with practical certainty (i.e. using 
advances in technology and science such as DNA testing), the 
decision strictly enforces the prescriptive period set forth in article 
189. The court explained its holding by recognizing the Louisiana 
Supreme Court’s explanation of the purpose of the presumption 
stating, “The action to disavow is to protect innocent children, born 
during marriage, against scandalous attacks upon their paternity by 
the husband;” because of this important purpose, the presumption 
should be zealously guarded and enforced.30 However, under the 
facts provided in the case, it was clear, through testimony, that the 
mother knew the identity of the other man she engaged in sexual 
intercourse with, making it possible to find and impose liability on 
the biological father for the support of his child.  
The policy questions raised by Judge Stewart’s concurring 
opinion are especially noteworthy. Particularly, he recognizes that 
this decision requires a man to support a non-biological child while 
the known, although absent biological father “escapes financial 
responsibility.” 31 The majority does say that contra non valentem 
could be applied to disavowal actions, but its discussion of the 
doctrine would likely lead to confusion in lower courts when 
applying this doctrine to similar disputes. The court merely 
recognizes its potential application, recognizes that the Plaintiff 
clearly knew of the child’s birth and believed at this time that it 
was his biological child, and that there was no question of filiation 
until almost four years later.32 There is no further explanation as to 
exactly why the doctrine should not apply. The court’s explanation 
seemingly hinges on the fact that the presumed father clearly knew 
                                                                                                             
 29. See, e.g., Tannehill v. Tannehill, 261 So. 2d 619 (La. 1972); Williams v. 
Williams, 87 So. 2d 707 (La. 1956).  
 30. Drew, 70 So. 3d at 1015 (citing Gallo v. Gallo, 03-0794 (La. 12/3/03); 
861 So. 2d 168).  
 31. Id. at 1016.  
 32. Id. at 1014. 
2012] SOCIAL SERVICES EX REL. K.B.D. V. DREW 275 
 
 
 
of the birth, and that the prescription period is unambiguous. 
However, Judge Stewart’s recommendation to remedy this 
situation seems reasonable—to apply contra non valentem in 
matters, such as the present case, where the mother withheld 
information, thereby making it impossible for the father to 
“reasonably know” of his possible cause of action.33 Today, this 
seems especially reasonable with the availability of DNA 
technology, allowing for biological and legal paternity to be more 
closely aligned without violating the strong public policy in favor 
of providing child support. Until there is clarification in the Second 
Circuit’s application of contra non valentem, the prescriptive 
period for disavowal actions will likely be strictly enforced to 
protect children born of a marriage. 
Another potential remedy for this apparent inequity would be 
to extend the policy embedded in the Louisiana Civil Code 
provisions on the designation of “dual paternity”34 to 
circumstances similar to those in the instant case—when a legal 
father is deceived by the mother and there is a known biological 
father. Civil Code article 198 would seemingly be the most 
relevant statement of law, capable of application through analogy 
to the instant situation.35 This article allows a biological father to 
establish paternity even if the child has a presumed father.36 The 
action to designate a biological father when a presumed father 
exists is typically limited by a one-year peremptive period, 
commencing at the time of birth of the child. However, the 
                                                                                                             
 33. Id. at 1017. 
 34. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 197, 198 (2011).  
 35. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 198 (2011); “A man may institute an action to 
establish his paternity of a child at any time except as provided in this Article. 
The action is strictly personal. If the child is presumed to be the child of another 
man, the action shall be instituted within one year from the day of the birth of 
the child. Nevertheless, if the mother in bad faith deceived the father of the child 
regarding his paternity, the action shall be instituted within one year from the 
day the father knew or should have known of his paternity, or within ten years 
from the day of the birth of the child, whichever first occurs. In all cases, the 
action shall be instituted no later than one year from the day of the death of the 
child. The time periods in this Article are peremptive.” 
 36. Id. 
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legislature provides a limited application of contra non valentem in 
circumstances of the mother’s deception of the biological father.37 
Specifically, the action may be instituted within one year from 
when the biological father knew or should have known of his 
paternity, but at the latest, within ten years of the child’s birth. 
Applying a similar contra non valentem period for the presumed 
father would not defy the policy in favor of child support as long 
as appropriate safeguards are followed—as long as a known 
biological father exists and may be held liable for support. Since 
dual paternity is already recognized in Louisiana, the legislature 
could at least allow courts to designate dual paternity in these 
narrow instances of deception of the presumed father. In these 
cases, courts could then adopt the process already recognized for 
setting child support in dual paternity cases designated under Civil 
Code articles 197 and 198.38 Doing so would not only ensure 
support for the child, but would also coincide with the policy 
argument recognized in the Reed case. In particular, the court 
stated, “the biological father does not escape his support 
obligations merely because others may share with him the 
responsibility. Biological fathers are civilly obligated for the 
support of the offspring.”39 In sum, with the proper legislative 
safeguards, there is no reason to continue requiring presumed 
fathers to be solely liable to support a child with a known 
biological father when the mother intentionally deceived the 
presumed father about the conception of the child. Especially with 
modern DNA testing, there should be action taken to better align 
legal and biological paternity.  
                                                                                                             
 37. Id.  
 38. See State of Louisiana, Department of Social Services ex rel. P.B. v. 
Reed, 10-410 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/26/10); 52 So. 3d 145 (requiring both the 
presumed and biological father to provide support to the child because it was 
found to be within the child’s best interest; and also requiring the child support 
guidelines to be followed, with each party providing to the court a verified 
income statement showing gross income and adjusted gross income, together 
with documentation of current and past earnings). 
 39. Id. at 147. 
